Among the political philosophers of the twentieth century, Leo Strauss is usually singled out for his attempt to revitalize the ancient approach to counter the relativism of both historicism and positivism. It is less commonly underscored, however, that the cornerstone of this attempt is the recovery of the question of "nature," which he regarded as inseparable from genuine philosophy since its inception in ancient Greece. Leo Strauss and the Recovery of "Natural Philosophizing" addresses such a theme, focusing on the theoretical presuppositions that Strauss found at the basis of the acquired inability to raise the question of nature. Prominent among these is the encounter between philosophy and revelation, which, due to their conceptual incompatibility, leads to a condition Strauss metaphorically described as a "second, 'unnatural' cave" characterized by insurmountable "prejudices" rather than "appearance and opinion." These, however, are the starting point of genuine philosophy in the Platonic "first, 'natural' cave," which has to be regained, by way of historical deconstruction of the presuppositions of the second cave, if the "natural philosophizing" embodied by Socratic dialectics is to be reactivated.
Among the political philosophers of the twentieth century, Leo Strauss is usually singled out for his attempt to revitalize the ancient approach to counter the relativism of both historicism and positivism. It is less commonly underscored, however, that the cornerstone of this attempt is the recovery of the question of "nature," which he regarded as inseparable from genuine philosophy since its inception in ancient Greece. Leo Strauss and the Recovery of "Natural Philosophizing" addresses such a theme, focusing on the theoretical presuppositions that Strauss found at the basis of the acquired inability to raise the question of nature. Prominent among these is the encounter between philosophy and revelation, which, due to their conceptual incompatibility, leads to a condition Strauss metaphorically described as a "second, 'unnatural' cave" characterized by insurmountable "prejudices" rather than "appearance and opinion." These, however, are the starting point of genuine philosophy in the Platonic "first, 'natural' cave," which has to be regained, by way of historical deconstruction of the presuppositions of the second cave, if the "natural philosophizing" embodied by Socratic dialectics is to be reactivated.
