Since the current Ukrainian crisis began in February 2014, the reemergence of a belligerent Russia forced NATO members, along with several countries outside of the alliance to show great interest in the new concepts of warfare. They fear that the "Ukrainian pattern" might be the new way of armed conflict, for which none of them is prepared and it seems that some countries are ready to reconsider their understanding of defense. This book offers a possible alternative for those nations by suggesting the implementation of an irregular warfare based national defense strategy. Considering the differences among countries concerning their military capabilities, it is clear that in case of invasion, many small states will not be able to resist by means of conventional warfare. Even though, irregular warfare is as old as man and has been present in every conflict since the beginning of war, it has never been considered a state-level, grand strategy to win a war. The geostrategic environment of today might be the setting in which to change this view. History teaches that those small states that are searching for self-reliant, effective homeland defense should stop pursuing the path of "sameness" that leads to certain defeat. Instead they should innovate by starting to "harvest from the edges of strategic thought" particularly thought about irregular warfare- to enhance their prospects for successful self-defense and national survival.
Since the current Ukrainian crisis began in February 2014, the reemergence of a belligerent Russia forced NATO members, along with several countries outside of the alliance to show great interest in the new concepts of warfare. They fear that the "Ukrainian pattern" might be the new way of armed conflict, for which none of them is prepared and it seems that some countries are ready to reconsider their understanding of defense. This book offers a possible alternative for those nations by suggesting the implementation of an irregular warfare based national defense strategy. Considering the differences among countries concerning their military capabilities, it is clear that in case of invasion, many small states will not be able to resist by means of conventional warfare. Even though, irregular warfare is as old as man and has been present in every conflict since the beginning of war, it has never been considered a state-level, grand strategy to win a war. The geostrategic environment of today might be the setting in which to change this view. History teaches that those small states that are searching for self-reliant, effective homeland defense should stop pursuing the path of "sameness" that leads to certain defeat. Instead they should innovate by starting to "harvest from the edges of strategic thought" particularly thought about irregular warfare- to enhance their prospects for successful self-defense and national survival.
