This book sets forth the results of a year-long investigation into the role of United States intelligence agencies with respect to alleged improprieties by the government, representatives and agents of South Korea in the United States. The Committee's investigation was conducted as a case study of the activities of "friendly" intelligence services in the United States. The South Korean case was selected because it was the subject of considerable public attention and much information was already available. The Committee is equally concerned about similar allegations that have been made about the intelligence activities of some other friendly countries. The Committee will continue to seek to ascertain the extent of the intelligence activities of other governments with whom the United States has good relations as well as the U.S. Government's response to these activities. The particular focus of the Committee, in examining the documentary record and interviewing key Executive Branch officials, has been on the extent to which the U.S. Government knew of the Korean government's activities, the decisions that were made, and the resulting actions which were or were not taken. The knowledge which the U.S. Government had, most of it based upon intelligence reporting, was extensive, detailed, and current. That knowledge ranged from simple awareness as early as 1963 that the Korean intelligence service was monitoring the activities of Korean residents in the United States, to knowledge by 1971-73 that the Korean Government was attempting by unlawful means to influence and sometimes intimidate hundreds of Korean nationals who were living in this country. It included knowledge in 1971, not only of plans to improperly influence Members of the- U.S. Congress, but also of unlawful payments that had actually been made that same year to members of the legislative branch to influence U.S. legislative action.
This book sets forth the results of a year-long investigation into the role of United States intelligence agencies with respect to alleged improprieties by the government, representatives and agents of South Korea in the United States. The Committee's investigation was conducted as a case study of the activities of "friendly" intelligence services in the United States. The South Korean case was selected because it was the subject of considerable public attention and much information was already available. The Committee is equally concerned about similar allegations that have been made about the intelligence activities of some other friendly countries. The Committee will continue to seek to ascertain the extent of the intelligence activities of other governments with whom the United States has good relations as well as the U.S. Government's response to these activities. The particular focus of the Committee, in examining the documentary record and interviewing key Executive Branch officials, has been on the extent to which the U.S. Government knew of the Korean government's activities, the decisions that were made, and the resulting actions which were or were not taken. The knowledge which the U.S. Government had, most of it based upon intelligence reporting, was extensive, detailed, and current. That knowledge ranged from simple awareness as early as 1963 that the Korean intelligence service was monitoring the activities of Korean residents in the United States, to knowledge by 1971-73 that the Korean Government was attempting by unlawful means to influence and sometimes intimidate hundreds of Korean nationals who were living in this country. It included knowledge in 1971, not only of plans to improperly influence Members of the- U.S. Congress, but also of unlawful payments that had actually been made that same year to members of the legislative branch to influence U.S. legislative action.
