The Strategy Bridge presents the general theory of strategy and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behavior in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, The Strategy Bridge tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The Strategy Bridge regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. The strategist seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labors. In order to maximize his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.
The Strategy Bridge presents the general theory of strategy and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behavior in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, The Strategy Bridge tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The Strategy Bridge regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. The strategist seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labors. In order to maximize his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.
