Russia Land-Based Electronic Warfare/RUMINT: The Last Mile Between Inbound Missile and Electronic Attack

Electronic Warfare (EW) is considered a relatively inexpensive way to curb an opponent's ability to communicate and exercise control within a battlespace. By now, everyone is aware that the incident where a Su-24 bomber allegedly flew over the American destroyer 'Donald Cook' described in practically all Russian media, during which the Russian aircraft supposedly employed its newest 'Khibiny' system to disable the ship's electronics is RUMINT (RUMINT - RUmor INTelligence [military]). RUMINT can be described as single-source disinformation that obfuscates or "puffs up" an adversary's capabilities. The text in RED thruout the book is RUMINT.

Russia's electronic warfare equipment specifications are a closely held SECRET so a lot is missing, but I was able to find quite a bit thru open sources. I will update as I find more. The systems included in this book typically have their own specialization. For example, the Divnomorye complex suppresses locators and other avionics of aircraft, helicopters and drones. The station also creates powerful interference for "flying radars" - E-3 AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye and E-8 JSTAR. It can hide objects within a radius of several hundred kilometers from radar detection. The Murmansk-BN complex suppresses communication and control channels within a radius of up to eight thousand kilometers. This technique is able to strip communications of warships, aircraft, drones and headquarters of the troops of a potential enemy. Electronic warfare systems "Moskva-1", "Krasukha-20" and "Krasukha-4" are often called "aircraft systems." They are designed to deal with aviation radars, as well as communications and information transfer technology. "Moskva-1" detects the enemy, determines the type and characteristics of its electronic warfare. Data is transferred to other systems. Krasukha-20 is responsible for the fight against early warning radar aircraft and "Kraukha-4" (captured one March 2022) interferes with other types of aircraft.

Thanks to experiences in conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, Russia's EW systems and tactics are evolving. The systems are more mobile, intelligent, and automated with a transition from narrowly specialized equipment to multifunction complexes, for the disruption of many types of electronic systems-radars, radio communications, navigation and others. The tactics are changing as well. For instance, Russian forces in Ukraine have been using small unmanned aircraft with electro-optical cameras and electronic direction finders to specifically locate and then jam counter-battery radars ahead of mortar and other artillery strikes.

According to Ukrainian General Kremenetskyi, Russian armed forces have developed their EW doctrines and they have been adept at learning lessons from recent conflicts and adapted their systems accordingly. "The speed with which the Russians have adapted their EW tactics has been very quick." Of course, Russian EW operators (occasionally) also simultaneously jam their own forces' equipment.

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